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ABSTRACT
This paper uses political reservations for women in India to study the impact of women’s
leadership on policy decisions.  In 1998, one third of all leadership positions of Village Councils in West
Bengal were randomly selected to be reserved for a woman: in these councils only women could be
elected to the position of head.  Village Councils are responsible for the provision on many local public
good in rural areas.  Using a data set we collected on 165 Village Councils, we compare the type of public
goods provided in reserved and unreserved Villages Councils.  We show that women invest more in
infrastructure that is directly relevant to the needs of rural women (water, fuel, and roads), while men
invest more in education.  Women are more likely to participate in the policy-making process if the leader
of their village council is a woman.
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Worldwide, women are under-represented in all political positions. In June 2000, women repre-
sented 13.8% of all parliament members, up from 9% in 1987. Compared to economic opportu-
nities, education, and legal rights, political representation is the area in which the gap between
men and women has narrowed the least between 1995 and 2000 (Norris and Inglehart 2000).
Increasing the political representation of women is often thought to be a “win-win” propo-
sition, increasing equity of eﬃciency: equity because women and men have diﬀerent political
agendas, and increased representation would ensure a better representation of women’s needs;
eﬃciency, because women are supposed to be better politicians (less likely to be corrupt, more
altruistic), and because the political agendas of women are thought to lead to investment in
child health and education, which have positive long term consequences on growth. Alleviating
deprivation and inequality in the political realm can thus have far reaching consequences, not
only for women, but for everyone (a point made most forcefully by Amartya Sen in Development
as Freedom (Sen 1999)). This position, articulated for example in the United Nations report,
The World’s Women (United-Nations (2000)), and in the World Bank’s report, Engendering
Development (World-Bank (2001)), shapes policies and debates around the world.
Because women’s representation in the political sphere advances slowly, and does not seem to
be greatly aﬀected by economic development, political reservations for women are often proposed
as a way to rapidly enhance women’s ability to participate in policy making. Quotas for women
in assemblies or on parties’ candidate lists are in force in the legislation of over 30 countries
(World-Bank (2001)), and in the internal rules of at least one party in 12 countries of the
European Union (Norris (2001)).
Reservation policies clearly have a strong impact on women’s representation.1 This does not
necessarily imply, however, that they have a impact on policy decisions. In standard “Downsian”
political economy models, where candidates can commit to a speciﬁc policy, political decisions
reﬂect the preferences of the electorate. In a Coasian world, even if the reservation policy
increases women’s bargaining power, policy decisions other than transfers to women should not
1See Jones (1998) for a study of the Argentinian case, and Norris (2001) for the impact of reservation in the
Labour Party in the UK. Women’s representation fell from 25% to 7% in Eastern Europe when gender quotas
were eliminated during the transition from Communism (World-Bank (2001)).
2be aﬀected. The eﬃcient outcome should be achieved, and women would then be compensated
with direct transfers.
There is some evidence that the assumption behind these models are violated. In the U.S.,
Levitt (1996) shows that politicians’ decisions are strongly inﬂuenced by personal ideology.
Female legislators devote more energy to women-speciﬁc issues than men do, and are also more
successful in passing legislation on women’s issues when they propose it (Thomas (1991), Thomas
and Welch (1991)). In India, Pande (1999) argues that reservation for minorities aﬀects targeted
transfers.
However, despite the importance of this issue for the design of institutions, very little is known
about the causal eﬀect of women’s representation on policy decisions. The available evidence,
based on cross-sectional comparison, is diﬃcult to interpret, because the fact that women are
better represented in a particular county or locality may reﬂect the political preferences of the
group that elects them. The correlation between policy outcomes and women’s participation
then may not reﬂect the causal eﬀect of women’s participation.2
Furthermore, even if we knew more about the causal eﬀect of women’s representation, this
knowledge would not necessarily extend to the eﬀects of quotas, or other mechanisms to en-
force greater participation of women in the political process. Ensuring women’s representation
through quotas may distort political competition and have direct eﬀects. For example, it may
lower the competency of the pool of eligible candidates, alter voter’s preferences over political
parties, and increase the number of politicians that are new in oﬃce.
This paper studies the policy consequences of mandated representation of women by taking
advantage of a unique experiment implemented recently in India. Since 1998, one third of all
positions of chief (Pradhan) of the West Bengal village councils (Gram Panchayat, henceforth
GP) have been reserved for women: only women may be candidates for the position of Pradhan
in a reserved GP. Furthermore, the reserved GP were selected randomly: GP were ranked by
2For example, Dollar, Fisman and Gatti (1999) ﬁnd a negative correlation between representation of women
in parliaments and corruption. Does this mean women are less corrupt, or that countries that are less corrupt
are also more likely to elect women to parliament? Besley and Case (1997) show that worker compensation and
child support enforcement policies are more likely to be introduced in states where there are more women in
parliament, after controlling for state and year ﬁxed eﬀects. But they explicitly recognize that the fraction of
women in parliament may be a proxy for women’s involvement in politics, more generally.
3their serial number, and every third GP was reserved for a woman. This has resulted in a
dramatic increase in the number of women elected as Pradhan.3 This policy was enacted ﬁve
years after a constitutional amendment that gave substantial power to the village councils to
deﬁne and implement local development projects, and maintain local infrastructure, using state
funds. Thus, the GP Pradhan makes decisions about which public goods to provide, and where
to provide them. We conducted a detailed survey of all investments in local public goods in all
the GP of one district (Birbhum, in West Bengal), and we compare investments made in reserved
and unreserved GP. Since GP were randomly selected to be reserved for women, diﬀerences in
investment decisions can be conﬁdently attributed to the policy of mandated representation of
women.
The results suggest that reservation does indeed aﬀect policy. Women participate more in the
political process in GP that are reserved for women. In those GP, there are also signiﬁcantly more
investments in drinking water infrastructure, recycled fuel equipment, and road construction.
By contrast, in unreserved GP, there are signiﬁcantly more investments in education. Health
workers are monitored more closely in reserved GP, and teachers are monitored less closely.
These results are interesting in their own right, because they show that the reservation policy
did indeed modify policy making. We can in addition exploit speciﬁc features of the reservation
legislation to investigate whether its eﬀects can be attributed to the gender of the Pradhan,
rather than to other consequences of reserving seats. We speciﬁcally investigate whether the
results can be explained by the fact that women are inexperienced, that they may be perceived
as less likely to be re-elected, and that they tend to come from a more disadvantaged background
than men.
These results thus indicate that a politician’s gender does inﬂuence policy decisions. More
generally, they provide new evidence on the political process. In particular, they provide strong
evidence, based on a randomized experiment, that the identity of a decision maker does inﬂuence
policy decisions. This provides empirical support to political economy models that seek to enrich
the Downsian model (Alesina (1988), Osborne and Slivinski (1996), Besley and Coate (1997)).
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the political context, the
policy, and the data set. Section 3 reviews the literature and discusses how political reservations
3In West Bengal, only 6% of Pradhan were women after the 1993 election.
4for women could aﬀect policy outcomes. Section 4 discusses these intervening mechanisms: it
compares the characteristics of male and female Pradhan, and shows that the reservation policy
did aﬀect women’s political participation. Section 5 presents the central results of the paper,
the diﬀerence in public goods provisions in reserved and unreserved GP. Section 6 examines
whether this diﬀerence can be mostly attributed to the eﬀect of the policy on the gender of the
Pradhan. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Policy and Design of the Study
2.1 The Panchayat System in West Bengal
The Panchayat is a system of village level (Gram Panchayat), block level (Panchayat Samiti), and
district level (Zilla Parishad) councils, elected by the people, responsible for the administration
of local public goods. The Panchayat system has existed formally in most of the major states of
India since the early 1950’s. However, in most states, the system was not an eﬀective body of
governance. Elections were not held and the Panchayats did not assume any active role (Ghatak
and Ghatak 1999). This changed in West Bengal in 1977, when the Left Front Government
gained power on a platform of agrarian and political reform. The most important part of the
land reform was tenancy reform, which enabled tenants to register and restricted the eviction
of registered tenants (Banerjee, Gertler and Ghatak 1998). The major political reform was to
give life to a three-tiered Panchayat electoral system. The ﬁrst election took place in 1978 and
elections have taken place at ﬁve year intervals ever since. The ﬁrst election took place in the
middle of a major political and social upheaval resulting from the land reform, which arguably
allowed the Panchayat to assume an important political role, independent of the traditional
landowning class. This may account for the importance of the institution in West Bengal,
compared to most other states of India (Ghatak and Ghatak 1999).
Each Gram Panchayat (GP) encompasses 10 to 12 villages and a population of about 10,000
people. The GP do not have jurisdiction over urban areas, which are administered by separate
municipalities. Voters elect a council, which then elects among its members a Pradhan (chief)
and an Uppa-Pradhan (subchief). The council takes decision by majority voting (the Pradhan
does not have veto power). The Pradhan, however, is the only member of the council with a full-
5time appointment. The major responsibilities of the GP are to administer local infrastructure:
repair public buildings (such as schools), maintain and construct drinking water and irrigation
facilities, excavate ponds (used for bathing, ﬁshing and irrigation), and maintain and construct
roads. The main source of ﬁnancing for these projects are state grants (the 73d amendment
stipulates that the ultimate objective is that 40% of the each State’s budget is to be spent by
the Panchayats). Until 1992, district funds were distributed through “schemes” earmarked for
a speciﬁc purpose. In 1992, the 73rd amendment to the Constitution of India established the
framework of a three-tiered Panchayat System with regular elections throughout India. It gave
the GP the primary responsibility for implementing development programs, as well as identifying
the needs of the villages under its jurisdiction. The main source of ﬁnancing is still the state,
but the money which was previously earmarked for speciﬁc uses is now allocated through four
broad schemes. Money is allocated under the Jawhar Rozgar Yojana (JRY) scheme for work in
public infrastructure. Second, there is a separate scheme for drinking water projects. Third, GP
have the responsibility to identify beneﬁciaries of social programs and disburse funds (widow’s
pension, relief, etc.), and receive funds for this purpose. Finally, the GP receives money for
its own operation (salary of secretary, honorarium for the Pradhan, building maintenance, etc.)
The GP was also given the right to collect income on its own, through taxation of assets, and the
establishment of collective ﬁsheries. According to balance sheets which we could collect in 40
GP the JRY accounts for 30% of total GP income, the drinking water scheme, 5%, the welfare
programs, 15%, the grant for GP functioning, 33%, and the GP own revenue for 8%.
Following the 73rd amendment, the GP was given additional responsibilities in West Bengal.
First, they were entrusted to establish and administer informal education centers (called SSK),
an alternative form of education for children who do not attend school (a non-qualiﬁed instructor
teaches children three hours a day in a temporary building or outdoors). They must also oversee
adult literacy programs. Most importantly, since May 1998, they are required to organize two
meetings per year, called “Gram Samsad”. These are meetings of villagers and village heads
in which all voters may participate (one Gram Samsad is organized for each 700 voters). The
GP council submits the proposed budget to the Gram Samsad, and reports on their activities
in the previous six months. Gram Samsads have been regularly held in most locations since
September 1998. While attendance is far from universal (16% of eligible participants), a study
6of 20 Gram Samsad meetings by Ghatak and Ghatak (1999) shows that the meetings give rise
to active debates over the kinds of projects that should be undertaken and the eﬀectiveness of
implementation of past projects, as well as charges of corruption and mismanagement.
The GP has no direct control over the appointment of formal teachers or health workers. It
is, however, supposed to monitor their performance. It also helps organize health information
campaigns and immunizations. Finally, it is responsible for organizing women’s organizations
and committees for the management of community-based ﬁsheries, forests, drinking water in-
frastructure, and schools.
2.2 Reservation for Women
In 1992, the 73rd amendment provided that one third of the seats in all Panchayat councils as
well as one third of the position of Pradhan must be reserved for women. Seats and Pradhan’s
position were also reserved for the two disadvantaged minorities in India, “scheduled castes” (SC)
and “scheduled tribes” (ST), which mandated representation proportional to each minority’s
population share in each district. States were asked to modify their electoral rules to conform
to this amendment.
In West Bengal, the Panchayat Constitution rule was modiﬁed in 1993, and reserved one
third of the position of councilors in each GP to women: in a third of the villages in each GP,
only women could be candidate for the position of councillor for the area. The proportion of
women elected to Panchayat councils increased to 36% after the 1993 election. The experience
was considered a disappointment, however, because very few women (196 out of 3,324 GP)
advanced to the position of Pradhan, which is the only one that yields eﬀective power (Kanango
(1998)).
To conform to the 73d amendment, the Panchayat Constitution Rules of West Bengal were
again modiﬁed in April 1998 (Government of West Bengal 1998). In addition of the reservation
at the village level within each GP, one third of GP were selected to be reserved for a female
Pradhan: in those GP, the council members had to elect one of their female members as Pradhan.
Likewise, a proportion of GP equal to the share of the share of SC and ST in the population
had to be reserved for SC and ST. A speciﬁc set of rules ensured a random selection of GP
where the oﬃce of Pradhan were to be reserved for a woman. All GP in a district were ranked
7in consecutive order, according to their serial legislative number (an administrative number pre-
dating this reform). They were then ranked in two separate lists, according to whether or not
the seats had been reserved for a SC/ST or not (these reservations were also chosen randomly,
following a similar method). Using these lists, every third GP starting with the ﬁrst on the list
was reserved for a woman for the 1998 election.4
From discussions with the government oﬃcial at the Panchayat Directorate who devised
the system and district oﬃcials who implemented in individual districts, it appears that these
instructions were successfully implemented throughout the state. More importantly, in the
district we study, we could verify that the policy was strictly implemented. After sorting the
GP into those reserved for SC/ST and those not so reserved, we could reconstruct the entire list
of GP reserved for a woman by sorting all GP by their serial number (allocated several years
before the law was passed), and selecting every third GP starting from the ﬁrst in each list. This
veriﬁes that the allocation of GP to the reserved list was indeed random, as intended. Table
1 indicates the number of female Pradhan is reserved and unreserved GP. All Pradhan in GP
reserved for a woman are female. Only 6.5% of them are female in unreserved GP. The policy
thus had a large eﬀect on the proportion of female Pradhan in the district.
2.3 Data Collection and Empirical Strategy
In the summer of 2000, we conducted a survey of all GP in the district of Birbhum, West Bengal.
Birbhum is located in the western part of West Bengal, about 125 miles from the state capital,
Calcutta. At the time of the 1991 census, it had a population of 2.56 million. Agriculture is
the main economic activity, and rice is the main crop cultivated. The male and female literacy
rates were 50% and 37%, respectively, lower than the West Bengal average of 67% and 47%.
The district is known to have a relatively well-functioning Panchayat system.
There are 166 GP in Birbhum, of which ﬁve were reserved for pre-testing, leaving 161 GP
in our study. Table 2 shows means of the most relevant village variables collected by the 1991
census of India in reserved and unreserved GP, and their diﬀerences. Panel A shows GP level
variables, and panel B shows village level variables.5 As expected given the random selection
4For the next election (in 2003), every third GP starting with the second on the list was reserved for a woman,
etc... The Panchayat Constitution rule has actual tables indicating the ranks of GP to be reserved in each election.
5The standard errors, like in the rest of the paper, are adjusted for clustering at the GP level, but the statistical
8of GP, there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between reserved and unreserved GP. Reserved GP
have a somewhat smaller total population, but this diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant. At the GP
level, the total number of health facilities, the number of public health facilities (hospital and
primary health centers and subcenters), and the number of schools of all types is very similar in
reserved and unreserved GP. Unreserved GP are marginally more likely to have a hospital. At
the village level as well, all variables are very similar in reserved and unreserved GP. Note that
very few villages (3% among the unreserved GP) have tap water, the most common sources of
drinking water being handpumps and tubewells. Most villages are accessible only by a dirt road.
91% of villages have a primary school but very few have any other type of school. Irrigation is
important: 43% of the cultivated land is irrigated (some land is irrigated in all villages). Very
few villages (8%) have any public health facility.
We collected the data for this study in two stages. First, we conducted an interview with the
GP Pradhan. We asked each a set of questions about his or her family background, education,
previous political experience, and political ambitions, as well as a set of questions about the
activities of the GP since his or her election in May 1998. We then completed a survey of three
villages in the GP: two villages randomly selected in each GP, plus the village in which the
GP Pradhan resides. During the village interview, we drew a resource map of the village with
a group of 10 to 20 villagers. The map featured all the available infrastructure in the village,
and we asked whether each of the available equipment items had been built or repaired since
May 1998. Previous experience of one of the authors, as well as experimentation during the
pre-testing period, suggest that this method yields extremely accurate information about the
village. We then conducted an additional interview with the most active participants of the
mapping exercise, in which we asked in more detail about investments in various public goods.6
For all outcomes for which it was possible, we collected the same information at the GP level
and at the village level. The village level information is likely to be more reliable, because it
is not provided by the Pradhan, and because for villagers, recalling investments made in their
village in the last two years was easy. However, the information given by the GP head refers to
investment in the entire GP, and is thus free from sampling error. Therefore, when an outcome
insigniﬁcance of these diﬀerences does not depend on this correction.
6The questionnaires are available upon request or on line at http://web.mit.edu/eduﬂo/www/.
9is available at both levels, we perform the analysis separately for both, and compare the results.
Due to the randomization built into the policy, the basic empirical strategy is straightforward.
Under the assumption that the reservation does not aﬀect investments in unreserved GP, the
reduced form eﬀect of the policy can be obtained by comparing the mean of the outcomes of
interest in reserved and unreserved GP. Denoting Yi the value of the outcome of interest (say,
investment in drinking water between 1998 and 2000) and Ri a dummy equal to 1 if the GP is
reserved for a woman, this is simply:
E[YijRi = 1] ¡ E[YijRi = 0]
In the village level regressions, the standard errors are adjusted for possible correlation
within GP using the Moulton correction (Moulton (1986)).7 Unless otherwise indicated, we run
village level regressions using only the data for the two villages we selected randomly, since the
Pradhan’s villages are not random and may be selected diﬀerently in reserved and unreserved
GP.
Since all the reserved GP have a female Pradhan, and only 6.5% of the unreserved GP do,
this reduced form coeﬃcient is very close to the coeﬃcient that one would obtain by using the
reservation policy as an instrument for the Pradhan’s gender.8 We will therefore focus on the
reduced form estimates, which are directly interpretable as the eﬀect of the reservation policy.
When interpreting these results, it should be kept in mind, that women elected as Pradhan diﬀer
from men in many important dimensions, other than gender. In particular, they are much more
likely to be new leaders, and they are probably less likely to be re-elected in the next election.9
The reduced form estimates capture all these potential eﬀects.
A very interesting feature of the experiment in West Bengal is that it is possible to try to
disentangle the eﬀect of gender per se from these other eﬀects of reserving electoral seats to
speciﬁc groups.
7The outcomes we consider are jointly determined, since they are linked by a budget constraint. However,
because the regressor is the same in all outcome equations, a joint estimation of the system of equations would
produce coeﬃcients and standard errors numerically identical to OLS estimation equation by equation.
8The instrumental variable estimate would simply be the reduced form estimate scaled up by a factor of 1.075.
(The ratio of the reduced form eﬀect and the diﬀerence in the probability that a woman is elected in reserved vs.
unreserved GP, which is equal to 93%
9Recall that the reservation rotates: seats that were reserved in 1998 will not be reserved again in 2003.
10First, we can control for whether the Pradhan is new or not. It would not be legitimate
to compare investments in all unreserved GP where Pradhan are new to those in reserved GP:
the fact that the Pradhan is new may reﬂect unobserved characteristics of the GP, and this
non-random sample selection would bias the results. There is, however, a random subset of
unreserved GP where the Pradhan is always new in oﬃce. Individuals may run for a council
seat only in the village in which she or he resides. Once elected, the councilors choose one of
them to be Pradhan. As part of the reservation scheme, one third of council seats (identiﬁed by
village) were reserved for women: thus, if the previous councilor was a man, and his seat was
reserved for a woman in the 1998 election, we can be sure that the Pradhan for that GP will be
new to oﬃce. We can therefore compare women Pradhan to this subgroup of new Pradhan, to
control for the fact that the Pradhan is new in oﬃce. Clearly, this does not fully control for the
Pradhan’s experience: even new Pradhan could be experienced politicians.
Second, we can control for whether the Pradhan is likely to be re-elected in 2003. Every
third GP starting with the second in the list will be reserved for a female Pradhan for the 2003
election. Pradhan in those GP should realize that they will not be able to stand for re-election
as Pradhan (if their particular seat is not reserved, they may still be able to run for a position
of member of the GP council). We therefore restrict the sample to GP reserved in 1998 and
those which will be reserved in 2003, to examine whether and to what extent the diﬀerences we
observe are due to the fact that women may not think they have a chance to be reelected.10
Again, men could still have a longer horizon in oﬃce than women, if they plan to be elected on
another position or be elected again in 10 years.
Finally, we take advantage of the reservation of about 44% of the seats to SC and ST. These
reservation were also selected randomly, and within each list, one third of positions were reserved
for women. Irrespective of their gender, all the leaders elected under this reservation policy tend
to be new leaders and to be elected in large part due to the quota system. They also tend to
10There are other reasons why a Pradhan may not be able to be a candidate in the next election: His GP could
be reserved for a SC or ST Pradhan. We do not exploit this because the system of SC reservation is based on a
table of random numbers, so it is much more diﬃcult for a Pradhan (and us) to ﬁgure out whether the seat will
indeed be reserved. His seat could also become reserved. We do not have the list of serial numbers within GP, so
we could not exploit this either. This does not invalidate our strategy: it is clear that in the subset of GP to be
reserved in 2003, the term limit does apply for all Pradhan.
11be poor, and to come from small villages. Therefore, we restrict the sample to GP that are
reserved for SC and ST. Remaining diﬀerences between investments in GP reserved for SC/ST
and those reserved for female SC/ST should be largely attributable to gender.
3 Why Would Mandated Representation of Women Aﬀect Pol-
icy Decisions?
Women and men have diﬀerent policy priorities. In developed countries, women are more likely
to support liberal policies, a diﬀerence known as the “gender gap”. The composition of the
voter pool is therefore likely to aﬀect policy outcomes.11 In developing countries, women’s and
men’s roles are diﬀerent, and they may therefore have diﬀerent needs and favor diﬀerent types
of investment. The primary responsibilities of women in rural West Bengal, besides working
on the ﬁelds, are to fetch water and fuel and to take care of children. Child health has been
shown to be more responsive to women’s income than to men’s income (see for example Thomas
(1990), Thomas (1994), and Duﬂo (2000)), which indicates that women are more concerned
than men about child health. It has also been suggested that the degree of women’s involvement
in collective decision making aﬀects policy decisions. For example, a study of rules set up by
village forest conservation committees in India shows that rules are very diﬀerent in villages
where women participated in their elaboration (Agarwal (1997)).
However, the fact that men and women have diﬀerent preferences is not enough to imply
that policies would be inﬂuenced by direct manipulation of the gender of representatives through
quotas. In a Coasian world, public good allocation should be unaﬀected (the eﬃcient allocation
should be achieved both before and after the policy). The additional bargaining power the
policy confers to women should translate into higher transfers to women. Even if these transfers
are not available, if the candidates could commit during the electoral campaign to a set of
policies, and if candidates knew the preferences of the voters, then electoral incentives would
cause candidates to commit to the policy bundle favored by a majority of electors. In this case,
11Lott and Kenny (1999) show that giving women the right to vote increased the size of state governments.
They argue that women’s preference for bigger government stems from their greater need for insurance. Edlund
and Pande (2000) suggest that the gender gap is indeed related to women’s expected need for insurance: the
gender gap is bigger in states where divorce is easier.
12the gender of the elected oﬃcial would not aﬀect policy. There are therefore two main lines
of argument why mandated representation of women could aﬀect policy decisions. The ﬁrst is
based on the idea that elected representatives cannot commit ex ante to a set of policies. In
this context, political reservations for women aﬀect both the gender of the politicians and its
selection. Pande (1999) discusses most of these arguments in the context of the reservations
for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes for the legislative assemblies in India, and presents
evidence that the reservations did aﬀect outcomes. The second is based on the idea that the
presence of women representatives aﬀects the mechanism by which preferences are aggregated.
Empirical evidence suggests that the preferences of legislators strongly aﬀect the decisions
they make. For example, Levitt (1996) shows that senators’ individual ideology is the single
most important factor explaining the way they vote. If the politicians do not commit ex ante
to a set of policies, the identity of the elected oﬃcial will determine policy decisions (Alesina
(1988), Osborne and Slivinski (1996), Besley and Coate (1997)). Constraining the candidate to
be a woman may then aﬀect policy decisions, if the overlap between women’s and men’s policy
preferences is not exact. In the US, it has been shown repeatedly that female legislators have
diﬀerent policy priorities than men (see, e.g. Thomas (1991),Carroll (1994),Thomas (1991)).
The idea that women tend to be more public spirited, less corrupt, and more “fair” is often
advanced as an argument in favor of active measures to facilitate women’s participation in
political decisions (World-Bank (2001), Dollar et al. (1999)). Women attach more importance
to, and spend more time advocating, women’s issues (abortion, equal opportunity) and child
welfare issues (such as child support), while men concentrate on business and economic policy.12
Thus, the number of female legislators predicts whether policies preferred more by women than
men will be adopted (Berkman and O’Connor (1993), Besley and Case (1997)).
The reservation policy does not aﬀect only the Pradhan’s gender, however. It aﬀects the
process by which she is chosen. First, since there were very few women active in politics before
the reservation policy was enacted, women elected under the policy are less likely to be incum-
bents. This could have positive or negative eﬀects: incumbents may have more clout and know
the system better. Alternatively, newly elected leaders may be more willing to start more new
12Saltzstin (1986) also shows that municipalities with women as mayors tend to have a higher proportion of
women in municipal employment, which suggests that women placed in power try to act in women’s interest.
13projects.
Second, the reservation constrains voters to choose among a limited set of candidates. Even
if there is not a competent woman, they have to choose one in reserved GP (while they are
always free to choose a competent woman in unreserved GP if there is no competent man). This
may thus aﬀect the leader’s quality. The average woman is also less educated than the average
man, less assertive, and less likely to have worked outside her home.
Third, women may have little hope of being re-elected outside the quota system, and since
the seats are reserved by rotation, they may have less political ambition. This is potentially
important, as the desire to be re-elected may provide an incentive for the elected representatives
to behave while in oﬃce.13 Khemani (2000) suggests that Indian voters are more “vigilant”
in state elections than in national elections. The Gram Samsad (village meeting) institution
ensures a high level of accountability for GP Pradhan, which suggests that the need to please
constituents in order to be re-elected may aﬀect Pradhan’ activities.
Fourth, the reservation policy may alter political competition. For example, if women ﬁelded
by parties on the right were known to be less demanding for women’s rights than women ﬁelded
by parties on the left, this may push some marginal male voters toward the right. It could thus
aﬀect policy decisions even on dimensions that are not directly relevant to women.
It has been suggested that all of these factors may not be relevant in the context of reservation
in India, because most women representatives act simply as proxy for their husbands. However,
women’s quotas could aﬀect policy decisions even if elected women had the same preferences
as elected men, or if all elected oﬃcials attempt to maximize the same social welfare function:
the sex of the Pradhan may eﬀect how information is transmitted. Both legally and in practice,
the most important role of the Pradhan is to aggregate information and decide how to spend
relevant resources. This is done in the Gram Samsad, and during oﬃce hours at which the
Pradhan meet with villagers. However, the participation of women at the Gram Samsad is
very limited (only 9% of participants were women in the 20 Gram Samsad studied by Ghatak
and Ghatak (1999)), and even when women are present, they rarely raise questions. The fact
that a Pradhan is a woman may then aﬀect the participation of other women to this process
13Besley and Case (1995) present evidence that this eﬀect is important for governors in the United States.
Governors who face term limits make decisions that are less likely to please voters (such as increasing taxes).
14of aggregating information. The fact that a woman is present in a position of authority may
encourage other women to raise issues, either during the Gram Samsad meetings or during her
oﬃce hours. Their remarks may be less likely to be taken desultorily.14 Enabling women to
express their concerns may have very important eﬀects on policy, even if the leader is not herself
very sensitive to women’s issues (and even if she is a proxy for her husband). Banerjee and
Somanathan (2001) show that a leader who is more aware of the underlying preferences of her
constituents is more likely to get them to talk and more likely to get information from them
that materially alters her decision. Thus the fact that a woman leader knows the other women
better than the male leader she replaces, will help her elucidate better their needs, even if she
is not particularly inclined towards women’s causes herself.
In the next section, we provide evidence on some of these intervening mechanisms: the
characteristics of the female Pradhan (including their background, their political aﬃliation,
their prior political experience and their political ambitions) and the eﬀect of the gender of the
Pradhan on women’s participation. In section 5, we turn to the main question of interest: does
the gender of the Pradhan aﬀect the the provision of public goods in the community?
4 Leaders and Voices: Characteristics of Female Pradhan and
Political Participation of Women
4.1 Characteristics of Female Pradhan
Table 3 presents diﬀerences by gender in the Pradhan’s background (panel A), her previous
political involvement and political ambition (panel B), and other’s perceptions of her. Column
(1) presents the average in reserved GP, and column (2) presents the average in unreserved GP.
Column (3) presents the diﬀerence. Standard errors are in parentheses. Female Pradhan are
signiﬁcantly less educated and less likely to be literate. They also come from a more disadvan-
taged background, which may be surprising: they are more likely to be oﬃcially classiﬁed as
14There is some evidence indicating this may be important: In the US, Thomas (1991) show that the degree
to which a woman legislator supports women’s issues depends on the number of other women in the assembly, or
the existence of a female caucus. In India, the study of joint forest management committee by Agarwal (1997)
referred to earlier also indicates that women talk more when there are more women in the meetings.
15being below the poverty line, and they own fewer durable household goods.15 They come from
smaller villages than men. This does not contradict the fact that GP reserved for women are no
diﬀerent from unreserved GP. Men often come from the biggest villages within their GP, while
women come from villages that are similar to the average village. Our interviewers are more
likely to report that female Pradhan are shy in answering the questions (and that someone else
may be answering on their behalf).
The results in panel B of table 3 conﬁrm that female Pradhan have less political experience
prior to the 1998 election. 89% of women (and 57% of men) holding reserved positions had not
been elected to any Panchayat position and most had not even participated in any Panchayat
activity. None of them had served as Pradhan (12% of men had). Women are only slightly
less likely to have received any training than men Pradhan, which reﬂects governments eﬀorts
to train the new Pradhan and counselors elected under the reservation rule (Kanango (1998)).
They are more likely to be helped by their spouse (43% of the women in reserved positions report
that they are helped by their spouse, compared with 13% of the men). 17% are the spouse of a
former Panchayat counselor or Pradhan. The worry that women may be their husband’s proxy
is thus not without foundation. Women are also more likely to claim that they will not run
again.
The reservation policy does not seem to aﬀect party aﬃliation: the percentage of Pradhan
in each political group (left front, right, and Congress) is identical in reserved and unreserved
GP.
4.2 Eﬀects on the Political Participation of Women
Table 4 displays the eﬀect of having a woman Pradhan on the political participation of women.
The percentage of women among participants in the Gram Samsad is signiﬁcantly higher when
the Pradhan is a woman (increasing from 6.9% to 9.9%). Since reservation does not aﬀect the
percentage of eligible voters attending the Gram Samsad, this corresponds to a net increase in
the participation of women, and a decline in the participation of men. This is consistent with
the idea that political communication is inﬂuenced by the fact that citizens and leaders are of
15We asked whether the Pradhan’s household owned a television, had electricity in the home, had a telephone,
a bicycle, a motorcycle, and a car. The durable goods variable is simply the sum of all of these variables.
16the same sex. Women are also more likely to ask a question at the Gram Samsad (the proportion
increases from 0.29 to 0.38, although the diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant at the 95% level). Finally,
women in villages with reserved Pradhan are twice as likely to have addressed a request or a
complaint to the GP Pradhan in the last 6 months, and this diﬀerence is signiﬁcant.16 The fact
that the Pradhan is a woman therefore signiﬁcantly increases the involvement of women in the
aﬀairs of the GP.
When women had raised an issue, we asked the villagers which issue they had raised. Our
questions were open ended, and we classiﬁed them ex-post into broad categories. We then re-
surveyed a random sub-sample of 48 villages, and asked about issues raised by men. Table
5 shows the range of questions, the fraction of total questions concerning each issue asked
by women (in column (1)), and by men (in column (2)). Drinking water and roads were by
far the issues most frequently raised by women (26% and 24% of the questions, respectively).
The next most important issue was welfare programs (these programs mainly target women:
they are maternity grants, widows’ pension, and old age pensions), followed by housing and
electricity. Road improvement is also the issue most frequently raised by men (22%). Three
other issues are raised relatively frequently by men: irrigation (17%), education (14%), and
drinking water (14%). This is consistent with the evidence in Ghatak and Ghatak (1999) on the
questions raised (by men) at 21 Gram Samsads in West Bengal: The questions that appeared
most frequently have to do with mis-management or corruption in program implementation (in
about half the villages), irrigation needs, road building, and the choice of program beneﬁciaries
or of project locations. Road building thus seems to be a concern common to men and women:
road construction projects are employment generating activities (especially for women), and
poor roads also make communication very diﬃcult during the rainy season. Women are more
concerned about drinking water than men, and less concerned about irrigation and education.
In the next section, we examine whether the gender of the Pradhan aﬀects the quantity and
the type of public goods provided and if the eﬀect is consistent with the preferences described
above.
16In the subsample of villages which we conducted follow up surveys we also asked whether men had brought
up any issue in the last 6 months. In all cases but one (a reserved GP), they had.
175 Eﬀects of the policy on Public Goods Provision
5.1 Public Action
In table 6, we examine whether the level of organization in the village is aﬀected by the reser-
vation policy. We have seen above that women were more active politically in villages where
the Pradhan is a woman. Is it because female Pradhan are generally more eﬀective at inducing
collective participation? To answer this question, we examine variables that reﬂect the extent
of organizations that the GP is supposed to sponsor: number of women’s organizations, number
of water and forest management committees, number of village education committees, areas
brought under social ﬁshery and social forestry, and proper organization of the Gram Samsads.
For none of these dimensions of organization is there a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between male and
female GP.
For a subset of GP (100), we collected information on their own revenue collection. GP
depend mostly on the state for resources (less than 8% of their budget come from GP revenue
collection), but they are authorized to collect revenues locally. Even after controlling for the GP
population, the amount of funds collected by the GP is signiﬁcantly smaller in GP reserved for
women. Tax collections as well as revenues from other sources (ﬁsheries, forestry, ponds, etc...),
are smaller in GP headed by women. The diﬀerence in tax collection is small compared to other
source revenue, which, in GP headed by women, is only half as large as in non-reserved GP. One
possible explanation for these results is that revenue collection is far from being straightforward:
collecting revenues requires eﬀective persuasion power, with respect to the individuals who owns
the taxable properties, and to the representative of the villages where the GP ponds and forest
are located.
GP, however, depend mostly on the state for resources, allocated largely in proportion to the
GP population. In the 40 GP for which we have complete budget data (including government
funds), the total budget is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent in male and female GP.
5.2 Public Good Investments
Table 7 presents the eﬀects of the Pradhan’s gender on all public good investments made by
the GP since the last election, in May 1998. As we aggregated investments in categories, these
18regressions reﬂect all the data we collected on public good investments. We present both village
and GP level regressions. The main results are consistent across the GP and village level data.
The gender of the GP Pradhan aﬀects the type of public goods provided.
Both at the GP level and at the village level, there is signiﬁcantly more investment in drinking
water equipment and roads in GP where the Pradhan is a woman. In addition, there is also more
investment in other labor intensive projects (culvert and minor irrigation canals), a variable we
have only at the GP level. The magnitude of these eﬀects is large: there is almost twice as
much investment in drinking water equipment in GP where the Pradhan is a woman, and the
roads are almost twice as likely to be in good shape. In all GP where the Pradhan is a woman,
tubewells were built, and labor intensive construction work was undertaken. Major roads are
20% more likely likely to have been repaired in women’s GP (dirt roads were repaired in all
GP).
The village level regression (though not the GP regression) also shows a very large diﬀerence
in the introduction of biogas projects (biogas projects were introduced in 6% of the unreserved
GP, and 26% of the reserved GP). Biogas projects are installations that produce methane gas,
used for cooking or lighting, from animal waste. They are a substitute for cooking fuel and
electricity. Collecting cooking fuel, as well as water, is primarily a woman’s task, and in Birbhum,
where the forest cover is very limited, obtaining wood can be particularly diﬃcult.
Both the GP and the village level regression show a negative (and large in the village level
regression) but insigniﬁcant impact of having a woman Pradhan on investment in sanitation.
This might seem somewhat surprising, but it should be noted that women never raised sanitation
as an issue.
Finally, there is less investment in informal education for children in GP headed by women.
Since 1998, the GP have been given the responsibility of organizing informal education centers,
by hiring and paying someone without formal qualiﬁcations to teach children not attending
school in a temporary building (or outdoors). They receive the authorization to set a center up
from the higher level of the panchayat or from the block level administration. Both at the GP
and the village level, the number of centers is negatively associated with the fact that the woman
is a Pradhan. The coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at the 95% only in the GP level regression, but the
point estimate in the village level regression is large in magnitude: villages located in GP where
19the Pradhan is a woman are only half as likely to have an informal education center than villages
in GP where the Pradhan is a man. To conﬁrm the validity of these results, we also regressed
the number of teachers, teachers per capita, children, and children per capita, at the informal
center (the regressions are omitted to save space). At the GP level, the coeﬃcient of the woman
dummy is signiﬁcantly negative for all these variables. There is no diﬀerence in investments in
the repair of school buildings. However, in GP headed by women, there is more investment in
buildings used for adult education (of which women are more often beneﬁciaries). Note that
there are almost no investments in the repair of the adult literacy centers in GP headed by
males, even though all GP receive an allocation speciﬁcally earmarked for adult education.17
To shed some light on this result, we restrict the sample to GP where the Pradhan is literate
(this result has to be taken with care, this the fact that the Pradhan is literate is certainly not
random): the eﬀect is smaller among literate Pradhan, suggesting that some of the negative
eﬀect of women on children’s education may be related to the fact that they are themselves less
educated.
These results suggest that the reservation policy has important eﬀects on policy decisions
at the local level. These eﬀects are consistent with the policy priorities expressed by women
(drinking water, road and power were the highest priorities of women, and education was a low
priority of women, and a priority of men) and with the view that women’s priorities are closely
linked with their role in the household. It should be noted that women’s main preoccupations
are also important issues for men. If we combine women’s and men’s requests (and give an equal
weight to both genders), drinking water and roads are by far the most important issues. The
decisions in reserved GP may thus correspond better to the entire’s village preferences.18
17Female GP, on the other hand, are no more likely than male GP to have had a literacy campaign since 1998.
18It is unfortunately not practical to assign a monetary value to these investments, and thus to compare them.
The fact that most investments are equal or greater in women’s GP suggest that women may be more eﬃcient
than men in spending the available resources.
205.3 Inﬂuence
The GP has no control over the establishment of health centers, or administrative appointments
such as health workers, doctors, or school teachers.19 However, it is supposed to exercise some
control over health workers and teachers, although in practice its inﬂuence over them is often
limited. Likewise, they have no direct control over the establishment of pre-primary child care
centers (Angan Wadi), which are controlled by a centrally administered program (The Integrated
Child Development Service), but they may seek to inﬂuence their placement. In table 8, we
examine whether the gender of the Pradhan also aﬀects outcomes over which she yields only
indirect inﬂuence. The ﬁrst two rows indicate that the gender of the Pradhan has no inﬂuence on
the opening of pre-schools. There were slightly fewer than two centers open per GP on average
since 1998, but they were equally distributed in female-headed and male-headed GP. This is
somewhat surprising, as child care is generally thought of as a woman’s priority.
The next two rows conﬁrm the results we obtained regarding informal education. Male
Pradhan are much more likely to report that the village education committee (instituted in all
GP since 1993) is eﬀective. Since this is the Pradhan’s own report, this could indicate that men
are more likely to report that they have inﬂuence. The next row suggests that the villagers do
not ﬁnd male Pradhan more eﬀective in controlling the primary schools. However, when asked
which problems they thought were present in the primary schools, men were more likely to
report low teacher turnout as a problem. Since this is one of the principal problems of primary
education, and one that eﬀective monitoring by village institutions could most likely aﬀect,
this suggests that male Pradhan are better informed, and may be more concerned, than female
Pradhan about the quality of education in the GP. This does not seem to be due to the fact
that schools perform less well in GP headed by men: when asked, the villagers are equally likely
to report that teacher attendance is a problem.
The next rows suggest that the opposite is true for health workers. The number of visits
by health workers to the village in the last six months is signiﬁcantly higher when the Pradhan
is a woman. This diﬀerence is entirely attributable to a diﬀerence in the number of visits to
villages that do receive visits by health workers, not a diﬀerence in the number of villages in a
19We collected data on these variables and veriﬁed that the number of health workers or teachers is not aﬀected
by the gender of the Pradhan.
21GP that receive visits. This suggests the diﬀerence may be due to active monitoring: Pradhan
have no inﬂuence on the route of village health workers, but female Pradhan seem to be eﬀective
in getting health workers to actually visit villages they are supposed to visit.
5.4 Do Women Invest Less in Their Own Villages?
Our last set of results in this section uses data on investments in the Pradhan’s village, which
we have not exploited thus far. The interpretation of these results is not as straightforward as
in the rest of the paper, since the Pradhan’s village is not chosen randomly, meaning sample
selection may be diﬀerent in reserved and non-reserved villages. As we have seen above, male
Pradhan come from bigger villages, while female Pradhan, especially those whose husbands
are not politically inﬂuential (i.e., those who are not “helped in their jobs”) come from more
ordinary villages.
Nevertheless, the results in this data are striking. In table 9, we use as a dependent variable
the same investment variables as in table 7. We run the following regression:
yk
ij = Ct + ®kRi + ¯kPij + °kRi ¤ Pij + ±Population + ²k
ij;
where yk
ij is the investment in good k in village j of Panchayat i, Ri is a dummy that indicates
whether the GP is reserved for a woman, and Pij is a dummy that indicates whether village j
is the Pradhan’s village. Thus, ¯k is the expected diﬀerence between investment in Pradhan’s
and non Pradhan’s village in unreserved GP, and °k indicates whether the diﬀerence is the same
among reserved GP. We control for the size of the villages, which is systematically diﬀerent in
Pradhan’s village, and in men’s village in particular. Columns (1) and (2) of table 9 report ¯k and
°k. The ﬁrst striking fact is that almost all investments are signiﬁcantly larger in the Pradhan’s
village. These diﬀerences are usually larger than the constant, indicating that the Pradhan’s
village receives more than twice as much as other villages receive, even after controlling for their
size. Second, the coeﬃcient of the interaction between the Pradhan’s village and female Pradhan
is negative for all outcomes but one, and signiﬁcant for three individual outcomes as well as for
all investments taken together (shown in the last line). The coeﬃcients of the interaction are
of the same magnitude as the coeﬃcient of the direct Pradhan eﬀect: there is no diﬀerence in
investment between the Pradhan’s village and other villages when the Pradhan is a woman.
22As we discussed in section 4, female Pradhan tend to come from smaller and poorer villages,
especially when they are not helped by their husband. This may account for the discrepancy
between male and female-headed Pradhan villages, even though we control for population size
in these regressions. To examine whether this is the case, we ran the same regressions using only
male Pradhan and Pradhan who are helped by their husbands. Female Pradhan who are helped
by their husbands come from villages which are similar to those of male Pradhan.20 The results
are at least as strong in this subsample. This suggests that the coeﬃcients of the interaction
are not pure artifacts of a composition bias in the sample, and that female Pradhan do indeed
invest less in their own villages.
This diﬀerence may be explained by diﬀerent levels of political ambition among women and
men. To be re-elected, the Pradhan must ﬁrst be elected as a council member in his or her
own village. Because women are less likely to seek re-election, they need to please their own
electors less. Levitt (1996) shows that senators are more likely to cast votes beneﬁting their
own constituencies when an election is near. Alternatively, women may have a weak bargaining
position vis-a-vis the other GP member on the locations of these investments.
6 Separating Gender and other eﬀect of reservations
The results we discussed so far could be attributed to other characteristics of the newly elected
women. First, they are inexperienced politicians. Second, they are more likely to be perceived
(by themselves or others) as “lame ducks”. Finally, we have seen that they are poorer, and come
from smaller villages than men. All these factors may aﬀect their decisions. In this section, we
use speciﬁc reservation rules to control for these characteristics.
6.1 Women are new Pradhan
In our sample, all the women who were elected in reserved position are new to the position
of Pradhan, whereas 12% of male Pradhan have previously served as Pradhan. Males also
have more experience as member of the GP council. This could have a direct inﬂuence on the
20The diﬀerence between the population of villages of male Pradhan and that of female Pradhan helped by
their husband is only 250, and is not signiﬁcant.
23investments made by men and women: inexperience Pradhan may have a hard time achieving
their objectives. On the other hands, they may be more energetic and want to start new project.
They may also favor new projects, rather than continuing existing projects.
To investigate whether the eﬀects of reservation is in part due to the fact that women are
newly elected, we compare them to another set of Pradhan who were newly elected due the
reservation policy at the village level: we compare investments in reserved GP to those in GP
where the previous Pradhan was prevented from re-election because his village was reserved for
a woman.
These results are presented in column (2) of table 10. For comparison, column (1) reproduces
the results for the entire sample. In this sub-sample, all Pradhan are elected for the ﬁrst time.
Men are, nevertheless, more experienced politicians: they are still more likely than women to
have served in the GP council before, but the diﬀerence is now smaller (0.24 instead as 0.32
in the entire sample). The point estimate for all the other results are unaﬀected, except for
the probability that a metal road was repaired, where the diﬀerences between reserved and
unreserved GP falls from 0.18 to 0.09. The coeﬃcient on the quality of the roads in the village,
however, remains unchanged, suggesting that day-to-day repairs remain more frequent in villages
in reserved GP. This may suggest that repairing a main road is among the ﬁrst thing a new
Pradhan does. This may be a very public gesture, since it is at the top of the priority of both
men and women.
However, none of the other results change. This suggests that the eﬀect reservation for women
has on policy cannot entirely be attributed to the fact that these women are new Pradhan.
6.2 Women are lame ducks
In column (3) of table 10, we present the diﬀerence between GP reserved in 1998 and those who
will be reserved in 2003. In these GP, the Pradhan faces a term limit. We determine which GP
will be reserved in 2003 by following the allocation rule (which was strictly followed in 1998).
Of course, this does not necessarily imply that the Pradhan themselves eﬀectively realize that
the GP will be reserved for a woman. Moreover, men could have a longer time horizon for the
career than just the next election. In fact, Pradhan in GP that will be reserved in 2003 are still
more likely than women to say that they want to run for the GP council again (they can still
24be a candidate for the council as long as their seat is not reserved).
The results for all other outcomes are essentially unaﬀected. With all the caveats mentioned
above, this still suggests that the results are not driven by women’s low immediate prospects.
6.3 Other eﬀects of reservation
It is also possible to control to some extent for these and other diﬀerences between men and
women, in particular for the fact that women tend to come from poorer families and smaller
villages, using minority reservations. Positions of Pradhan were reserved for Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes, proportional to their population in the district (34.5% and 11.5%, respec-
tively). The 1998 Panchayat Rules prescribe that the randomization for women be stratiﬁed:
among seats reserved for each group as well as among “general” seats, one third must be ran-
domly selected to be reserved for women. Column (4) in table 10 shows the diﬀerences female
and male GP in reserved GP. Since this policy was also enacted in 1998, most of the Pradhan
in GP reserved for SC and ST are new. Only 2% (one) of the male Pradhan in SC/ST GP
has previously served as Pradhan, and 22% have served as GP member. The diﬀerence in the
proportion of incumbents is thus much smaller (14%) than in the entire sample, and not sta-
tistically signiﬁcant. Men are still more likely to say that they may run again. Importantly,
among SC/ST Pradhan, women and men come from villages of the same size, and men are not
signiﬁcantly richer than women. They are, however, better educated.
In column (4) of table 10, we compare outcomes in GP reserved for SC or ST. The results
are very similar to what we found in all GP. The only notable exception is the weakening of the
eﬀect on the number of doctor visits in the village (which is due to the fact that even GP that
are unreserved for women, there are more visits by doctors in SC and ST villages).
The last row of table 9 examines whether, even in GP reserved for SC and ST, women are
less likely than men to invest in their own villages. The result is not changed: even in GP
reserved for SC or ST, men are more likely to invest in their own village, while women aren’t.
Irrespective of their gender, all SC/ST Pradhan are elected because of the quota system,
most of them have no experience, and women and men share similar social background. The
fact that most results remain unchanged suggest that the diﬀerence in public good investments
was a consequence of the Pradhan’s gender.
257 Conclusion
Mandated representation of women has important eﬀects on policy decisions in local government.
Women elected as leaders under the reservation policy invest more in public goods most
closely linked to women’s concerns: drinking water, fuel, and road construction. They also
appear to exercise inﬂuence over health workers to induce them to visit the villages more often.
The increase in investments in drinking water, fuel, and roads seems to come at least partly
at the expense of investments in informal schooling. Men invest more resources in informal
education centers, and seem also more aware of the need to exercise inﬂuence over teachers to
elicit more regular attendance. This relative lack of interest of women in charge for education
is not as surprising as the commonly held view that women strongly support everything that is
good for children might suggests: among the problems mentioned by women in the village we
surveyed, education appears relatively infrequently, whereas it is an important issue for men.
These results seems to be largely attributable to the eﬀect of the policy on the gender of
the Pradhan, rather than on its other eﬀects: with only two exceptions, the results are virtually
identical in the subsample of GP reserved for SC/ST, when we compare GP which will be
reserved in 2003 to those that were reserved in 1998, and when we compare GP reserved to
women to those where the Pradhan is also new due to the reservation policy.
Drinking water and irrigation, the two issues in which women invest more than men, are also
among men’s priorities. Leaders in reserved GP thus appear to better represent the preferences
of the entire community than leaders in unreserved GP.
These results contradict the simple intuition behind the Downsian model, or the idea that
political decisions are the outcomes of a Coasian bargaining process: in both of these views of
the world, the fact that a woman is the head of the GP should not inﬂuence policy decisions.
Indirectly, these results also conﬁrm that the panchayat has eﬀective control over the policy
decisions at the local level. These results suggest that direct manipulation of the identity of
the policy maker can have important eﬀects on policy. This has important implications beyond
reservation policy, suggesting that all mechanism that aﬀect politician’s identities (term limits,
eligibility conditions, etc) may aﬀect policy decisions. These results leave open the question of
whether this is due to the increased participation of women in the political process, or to the
26fact that the decision maker’s preferences now reﬂect women’s preferences, rather than men’s.
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29Table 1: Fraction of Women among Pradhans in Reserved and Unreserved GP
Reserved Non reserved Difference
GP GP
(1) (2) (3)
Total number  54 107
% Female  100 6.5 93.5   
(3.38)Table 2: Village Characteristics in Reserved and Unreserved GP, 1991 Census
Mean, reserved Mean, unreserved Difference
GP GP
Dependent variables (1) (2) (3)
A. GP Level 
Total Population 12606 13579 -973
(570) (329) (614)
Number of public health facilities 0.76 1.10 -0.34
(.17) (.17) (.26)
Number of health facilities (total) 7.15 7.10 0.05
(.90) (.67) (1.14)
Number of Hospitals 0.00 0.09 -0.09
(.05) (.06)
Number of High Schools 1.19 1.37 -0.19
(.17) (.18) (.29)
Number of Middle Schools 0.69 0.66 0.02
(.11) (.08) (.13)
Number of Primary Schools 12.26 12.07 0.18
(1.00) (.37) (.88)
B. Village level
Total Population 974 1022 -49
(60) (46) (75)
Female Literacy Rate 0.35 0.34 0.01
(.01) (.01) (.01)
Male Literacy Rate 0.57 0.58 -0.01
(.01) (.01) (.01)
% Cultivated land  that is irrigated 0.45 0.43 0.02
(.03) (.02) (.04)
Dirt road 0.92 0.91 0.01
(.02) (.01) (.02)
Metal road 0.18 0.15 0.03
(.03) (.02) (.03)
Bus or train stop 0.31 0.26 0.05
(.04) (.02) (.04)
Number of Public health facilities 0.06 0.08 -0.02
(.01) (.01) (.02)
Number of tuwells and hand pumps 1.13 1.20 -0.07
(.11) (.08) (.14)
Number of drinking water wells  0.44 0.47 -0.02
(.07) (.04) (.08)
Tap Water 0.05 0.03 0.01
(.03) (.02) (.03)
Number of Primary Schools 0.95 0.91 0.04
(.07) (.03) (.08)
Number of Middle Schools 0.05 0.05 0.00
(.01) (.01) (.01)
Number of High Schools 0.09 0.10 -0.01
(.01) (.01) (.02)
Notes:
1) There are 161 observations in the GP level regressions and 2120 observations in the village level 
regressions
2) Standard errors given in parentheses. In the village regressions they are corrected for clustering 
at the GP level Table 3: Pradhan's Characteristics in Reserved and Unreserved GP
Mean, reserved Mean, unreserved Difference
GP GP
Depedent variables (1) (2) (3)
A. PRADHAN'S BACKGROUND
Age 31.87 39.72 -7.85
(1.08) (.87) (1.45)
Education 7.13 9.92 -2.79
(.48) (.29) (.54)
Literacy 0.80 0.98 -0.19
(.06) (.01) (.04)
Married 0.89 0.87 0.02
(.04) (.03) (.06)
Number of children 2.45 2.50 -0.05
(.2) (.15) (.26)
Below poverty line 0.46 0.28 0.18
(.07) (.04) (.08)
Number of household assets 1.72 2.36 -0.64
(.18) (.14) (.23)
Population of pradhan's own village 1554 2108 -554
(204) (179) (291)
Hesitates when answering the questions 0.75 0.41 0.34
(interviewer's impression) (.06) (.05) (.08)
B. PRADHAN'S POLITICAL AMBITION AND EXPERIENCE
Has been elected in the GP council 0.11 0.43 -0.32
before 1998 (.04) (.05) (.07)
Has been elected has pradhan 0.00 0.12 -0.12
before 1998 (.03) (.04)
Took part in Panchayat activities 0.28 0.78 -0.50
 before elected (.06) (.04) (.07)
Knew how GP functioned 0.00 0.35 -0.35
(.05) (.07)
Did not receive any formal training 0.06 0.00 0.06
(.03) (.02)
Was spouse ever elected to the  0.17 0.02 0.15
Panchayat? (.05) (.01) (.04)
Does spouse help? 0.43 0.13 0.30
(.07) (.03) (.07)
Will not run again 0.33 0.21 0.13
(.06) (.04) (.07)
C. PRADHAN'S POLITICAL PARTY
Left Front 0.69 0.69 -0.01
(.06) (.04) (.08)




(1) Standard errors are given in parenthesesTable 4: Effect of Women's Reservation on Women's Political Participation
Mean, reserved Mean, unreserved Difference
GP GP
Dependent variables (1) (2) (3)
Participation rate in  12.33 13.07 -0.74
last Gram Samsad (in percentage) (1.09) (.9) (1.47)
Fraction of women among  9.80 6.88 2.92
participants in the Gram Samsad (in percentage) (1.33) (.79) (1.44)
Did women raise questions at the 0.38 0.29 0.08
last Gram Samsad? (.05) (.04) (.06)
Have women addressed a complaint to 0.20 0.11 0.09
the GP in the last 6 months (.04) (.03) (.05)
Notes
(1) Standard errors in parentheses
(2) There are 322 observations in the village level regressions
(3) Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the GP level in the village level regressions, using 




Drinking water 0.26 0.14
Road improvement 0.25 0.22
Welfare programs 0.10 0.04
Housing 0.09 0.05
Electricity 0.08 0.08
Child care 0.05 0.01
Health 0.05 0.02
credit/employment/women's group 0.04 0.08




(1) Each cell is the number of times an issues was mentionned, divided
by the total number of issues mentionned.
(2) The data for men comes from a subsample of 48 villages
Fraction of issues raised byTable 6: Effect of Women's Reservation on Organizations in the GP
Outcome Mean, reserved Mean, unreserved
GP GP no control controlling
for population
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. VILLAGE LEVEL
Women organisations, self help groups 0.05 0.03 0.01
 created since 1998 (.02) (.01) (.02)
Number of tubewells management  0.04 0.03 0.01
comittees created since 1998 (.02) (.01) (.02)
Village education and Village attendance 1.10 1.04 0.06
committees created since 1998 (.07) (.05) (.09)
Number of health information campaigns 2.69 2.81 -0.11
and immunization campaigns since 1998 (.27) (.19) (.33)
All the previous 5 planned Gram Samsad 0.64 0.70 -0.06
 were held.  (.05) (.04) (.06)
B. GP LEVEL
Women organisations, self help groups  0.26 0.34 -0.08
and micro-credit groups created since 1998 (.06) (.05) (.08)
Does the GP has a forest management 0.72 0.79 -0.06
committee or a drinking water committee (.06) (.04) (.07)
Additional acreage brought under 0.93 0.60 0.33
social forestries or fisheries since 1998 (.53) (.21) (.48)
Village education and Village attendance 10.17 10.57 -0.40
committees created since 1998 (.83) (.74) (1.19)
Number of health information campaigns 5.43 6.48 -1.05
and immunization campaigns since 1998 (1.01) (.80) (1.34)
Total Own fund collected in 1998 40.63 59.11 -18.48 -17.79
 (rs. 1000) (6.28) (6.06) (9.58) (9.79)
Taxes 25.83 34.34 -8.51 -7.63
(2.84) (3.26) (5.01) (5.12)
Other revenues 9.92 26.53 -16.61 -16.36
(2.28) (4.54) (6.59) (6.76)
Notes:
(1) Standard errors in parentheses
(2) There are 322 observations in the village level regressions, and 161 in the GP level regressions.
There are only 100 observations in the last three rows
(3) Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the GP level in the village level regressions, using 
Moulton (1986) formula
DifferenceTable 7: Effect of Women's Reservation on Public Goods Investments
Dependent  Mean, reserved Mean, unreserved Difference
variable GP GP
(1) (1) (2) (3)
A. VILLAGE LEVEL
Number of drinking water facilities  23.83 14.74 9.09
newly built or repaired (5.00) (1.44) (4.02)
Number of irrigation facilities 3.31 3.67 -0.36
newly built or repaired (.81) (.81) (1.27)
Condition of roads (1 if in good  0.41 0.23 0.18
condition) (.05) (.03) (.06)
Number of latrines and drainage pits 0.14 0.42 -0.28
newly built or repaired (.08) (.13) (.19)
Number of new biogas facilities 0.26 0.06 0.20
(.11) (.02) (.08)
Number of informal education centers 0.06 0.12 -0.06
(.02) (.03) (.04)
Nuber of of adult education centers 0.10 0.01 0.09
newly built or repaired (.04) (.01) (.03)
Number of formal school buildings 0.59 0.51 0.07
newly built or repaired (.10) (.05) (.10)
B. GP LEVEL
1 if a new tubewell was built 1.00 0.93 0.07
(.02) (.03)
1 if at least one  irrigation pump was built 0.17 0.09 0.07
(.05) (.03) (.05)
1 if a metal road was built or repaired 0.67 0.48 0.19
(.06) (.05) (.08)
1 if a culvert or a minor 1.00 0.85 0.15
irrigation canal was built or repaired (.) (.03) (.05)
1 if new toilets or new drainage 0.50 0.57 -0.07
pits were constructed (.07) (.05) (.08)
1 if new biogas equipment was introduced 0.50 0.45 0.05
(.07) (.05) (.08)
1 if there is an informal education 0.67 0.82 -0.16
center in the GP (.06) (.04) (.07)
1 if there is an informal education 0.74 0.83 -0.08
center in the GP (literate pradhans) (.07) (.04) (.07)
1 if there is a continuing education center 0.91 0.87 0.04
or if there was a literacy campaign  (.04) (.03) (.05)
Notes:
(1) Standard errors in parentheses
(2) There are 322 observations in the village level regressions, and 161 in the GP level regressions.
There are only 100 observations in the last row
(3) Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the GP level in the village level regressions, using 
Moulton (1986) formulaTable 8: Effect of Women's Reservation on Formal Education and Health Outcomes
Mean, reserved Mean, unreserved Difference Number  of
GP GP obs.
(1) (2) (3) (5)
Number of pre-school 0.18 0.54 -0.36 160
centers opened since 1998 (GP) (.05) (.37) (.52) col1 col2 col3 col5
Number of pre-school 0.18 0.54 -0.36 252
centers opened since 1998 (Village level) (.43) (.3) (.46)
Pradhan reports that the Village education Committee 0.80 0.89 -0.09 161
has influence over the primary school (GP) (.06) (.03) (.06)
Villagers report that the Panchayat has influence over 0.37 0.32 0.05 322
the running of the primary school (Village) (.05) (.04) (.07)
Pradhan reports that low teacher attendance is a  0.44 0.65 -0.21 161
problem. (GP) (.07) (.05) (.08) col1 col2 col3 col5
Pradhan reports that low teacher attendance is a  0.47 0.66 -0.19 148
problem. (GP, litterate pradhans only) (.08) (.05) (.09)
Villagers report that low teacher attendance is a problem 0.31 0.34 -0.03 322
(village) (.05) (.04) (.06)
Number of health workers or doctor visits in the villages 12.11 9.00 3.11 322
in the last 6 months  (1.44) (.95) (1.67)
Number of health workers or doctor visits in the villages 15.03 11.01 4.02 262
in the last 6 months (for village with at least 1 visit).  (1.55) (1.09) (1.63)
Notes:
(1) Standard errors in parentheses
(2) Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the GP level in the village level regressions, using 
Moulton (1986) formula
(3) All equations are estimated jointly in the GP level regressions and the standard errors account
for interequation correlation. Table 9: Effect of Women's Reservation on the Location of Public Goods
Pradhan's village reserved for woman Pradhan's village reserved for woman
Dependent variable *pradhan's village *pradhan's village
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Drinking water  38.9 -33 37 -51
(12) (16) (11) (22)
Irrigation 0.52 3.05 0.27 -2.71
(1.5) (2.4) (1.6) (2.2)
Road 0.19 -0.13 0.19 -0.1
(0.058) (0.098) (0.058) (0.150)
Sanitation 1.69 -1.56 1.67 -1.23
(0.88) (0.94) (0.86) (1.04)
Biogas 0.42 -0.081 0.45 -0.11
(0.15) (0.28) (0.15) (0.40)
Informal education 0.029 0.02 0.012 -0.0076
(0.085) (0.061) (0.062) (0.120)
Adult education 0.31 -0.23 0.32 -0.26
(0.080) (0.110) (0.081) (0.110)
Formal education  0.47 -0.5 0.47 -0.66
(0.12) (0.18) (0.12) (0.22)
All invesments 42.6 -32.2 40 -55.9
cumulated (12) (17) (11) (23)
All invesments 21.7 -21.8 22.2 -33
cumulated, GP  (6.7) (11.4) (6.7) (18.8)
reserved for SC/ST
Number of observations 477 384
Notes: 
(1) each row gives the result from a separate regression of the dependent variable on
gp population, a dummy for woman reservation, a dummy for pradhan's village and the interaction between
pradhan's village and woman reservation dummies. Only the last two coefficients are reported.
(2) standard errors in parentheses
(3) Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the GP level 
(4) Variables in this table are defined as in table 8
(5) There are 218 observations for the last line, column (1) and (2), and 170   for the last line, column (3) and (4)
All GP GP where woman is helpedTable 10: Effect of Women's Reservation in Selected Sub-Samples
All GP  Previous pradhan's  GP will be reserved GP is reserved 
constituency reserved in 2003 for SC/ST
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PANEL A: PRADHAN'S BACKGROUND AND EXPERIENCE
Pradhan's education -2.79 -2.58 -3.31 -2.65
(.54) (.68) (.61) (.86)
Number of assets -0.64 -0.70 -0.60 -0.37
(.23) (.26) (.26) (.27)
Population of Pradhan's village -554 -482 -357 14
(291) (312) (349) (381)
Elected in GP council  -0.32 -0.24 -0.31 -0.14
before 1998 (.07) (.08) (.08) (.09)
Elected as Pradhan before 1998 -0.12 0.00 -0.08 -0.02
(.04) (.) (.04) (.03)
Will not run again 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.16
(.07) (.09) (.09) (.1)
PANEL B: WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION
Have women addressed a complaint to 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.10
the GP in the last 6 months (.05) (.06) (.06) (.06)
PANEL C: PUBLIC GOODS
Revenue collection in the GP  -18 -14 -7 -11
(controlling for GP population)  (10) (11) (10) (14)
Village level:
Number of drinking water facilities  9.09 8.44 10.14 10.59
newly built or repaired (4.02) (5.5) (5.25) (6.01)
Condition of roads (1 if in good  0.18 0.21 0.21 0.25
condition) (.06) (.07) (.06) (.08)
Number of new biogas facilities 0.20 0.17 0.21 0.22
(.08) (.12) (.12) (.15)
Nuber of of adult education centers 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.09
newly built or repaired (.03) (.04) (.04) (.04)
GP level:
1 if a new tubewell was built in the GP 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.09
(.03) (.04) (.03) (.05)
1 if a metal road was built or repaired in the GP 0.19 0.11 0.17 0.22
(.08) (.09) (.1) (.12)
1 if there is an informal education -0.16 -0.14 -0.13 -0.14
center in the GP (.07) (.09) (.09) (.11)
PANEL C: MONITORING
Pradhan reports that low teacher attendance is a  -0.21 -0.19 -0.22 -0.24
problem. (GP) (.08) (.1) (.1) (.11)
Number of health workers or doctor visits  3.11 2.34 3.40 0.87
in the last 6 months (for village with at least 1 visit).  (1.67) (2.14) (1.82) (2.48)
Note
(1) Column 2 presents the difference between the mean of the dependent variable in GPs 
reserved for women and GP where the previous Pradhan was prevented from re-election due to a reservation of his boot
There are 55 GP (110 villages) reserved for women, and 51 GP (102 villages) where the previous pradhan's boot is reserved
(2) Column 3 presents the difference between the mean of the dependent variable in GP
reserved for women and GP that will be reserved for woman in 2003
There are 55 GP (110 villages) reserved for women in 1998, and 52 GP (146 villages) that will be reserved in 2003
(3) Colum 4 presents the difference between the mean of the dependent variable in GP reserved 
for a woman SC/ST and GP reserved for a SC/ST
There are 78 GP (146 villages) reserved for SC and ST, including 28 reserved for women as well
(4) Standard errors are in parentheses, and are corrected for correlation at the GP level in the village level regressions
Difference between GP reserved for 
women and unreserved GP